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1.0

Executive Summary

The virus that causes Abalone Viral Ganglioneuritis (AVG) is considered to be exotic to Western
Australia (WA). The known distribution includes Victoria, Tasmania and Taiwan. There are a
number of known strains of the virus; Tasmanian strains do not (to date) cause mortalities in
wild abalone (but do so in farms and processing facilities). Victorian and Taiwanese strains
cause high mortalities in wild abalone. Despite active surveillance, the virus has not been found
in NSW, South Australia or Western Australia but there is a low likelihood that WA specific
strains may exist undetected.
The risk posed by AVG virus occurring in juveniles sourced from hatcheries in WA and
translocated to the open ocean in southern Western Australia either for stock enhancement (reseeding) or for marine grow-out (sea-ranching) purposes has been assessed using standard risk
assessment methodology with the outputs having been independently reviewed.
While the likelihoods of the AVG virus occurring in the hatchery range from “negligible to “low”
should no additional management measures be applied, the consequences of detection (including
biological, economic and environmental) are generally “High” and in two cases the resultant
risks were “unacceptable” with just the current legal management requirements. Given that the
initial risks associated with oceanic deployment of abalone were assessed as Moderate to High,
additional formal management intervention is required to reduce these to acceptable levels.
The primary concern is that the virus could become established in a hatchery facility and then
be more likely to infect wild stock through the release of hatchery released juveniles into the
oceanic waters. The likelihood of this outcome occurring has been assessed as very low if
the suggested hatchery management measures that could be applied to mitigate the risk to an
acceptable level are adopted. Protocols are in place to ensure that any emergence of AVG in
a hatchery would be detected. If the virus was ever detected in the hatchery the water supply
should be immediately shut down. This can be done using existing legislation (FRMA r177(2)
so there is no legislative impediment to limiting effects of a disease outbreak in a hatchery).
The placement of grow out structures and juvenile releases could also be planned in a manner
to both minimise the likelihood of transmission to wild stocks and limit the spread of any
infection.
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2.0

Background

Abalone viral ganglioneuritis was first identified on abalone farms in Victoria in 2005 and
subsequently spread to the wild abalone fishery where it caused substantial mortalities.
Subsequently, there were outbreaks of AVG in Tasmanian live-holding processing facilities
in 2008 and 2009. In December 2010 there was a further outbreak of AVG disease in
Tasmanian abalone. The disease was initially detected in abalone processors facilities
and subsequently spread through untreated discharge to the marine environment and to
a local abalone farm, resulting in the compulsory destruction and decontamination of all
of the affected facilities. As a result, some members of the wildstock fishery in WA have
raised concerns over the risk of AVG disease in Western Australia relative to the current
and proposed projects that involve releasing hatchery-reared abalone back into the wild.
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3.0

Methodology Adopted In This Report

Risk Assessment was undertaken using the approach outlined in Jones & Stephens (2006) and
in Diggles (2011). This methodology is consistent with the Australian Standard AS/NZS ISO
31000:2009. A risk assessment requires several steps:
yy Establish the ‘scope’ or context;
yy Hazard identification or ‘risk identification’ (what can go wrong);
yy Risk analysis and ‘risk evaluation’ (how likely is it to go wrong?);
yy Risk management (what can we do about it?);
yy Monitor and regularly review the effectiveness of all steps in the process.

3.1

The Scope

The scope is to assess the risk posed by AVG in the translocation of juveniles sourced from any
Abalone hatchery in WA to the open ocean.

3.2

Hazard identification

Hazard identification was accomplished using “Failure Mode Analysis”. Failure Mode Analysis
is an engineering technique used to identify critical steps that lead to systems failure (in this case,
an outbreak of AVG among wild abalone on the South Coast caused by the abalone hatchery).
The diagrams of the pathways identified for “failure” to occur are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Compendium map of potential pathways leading to an AVG outbreak originating from farm
activities in Western Australia. “Avoid testing” refers to a possible pathway by which animals
are released without health checks.
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3.3

Assessment of Risk

The assessment of risk can be undertaken in a quantitative manner, in which the likelihood
and consequences are expressed in mathematical terms and the risk is expressed in terms such
as “one event in 100 years”. This approach presents particular challenges (Murray 2002) and
usually involves Monte Carlo simulation modelling (Vose 2000). This approach was used
in estimating the risk of abalone escaping from an abalone farm (Hawkins & Jones 2002).
An alternative approach, particularly where information is scarce, or time is short, is to use a
qualitative or semi-quantitative method where likelihood and consequences are expressed in
terms such as “high”, “medium” or “low”. This approach was used in the Tasmanian abalone
industry risk assessment (Anon. 2007) and is the one that was used in this report.
Likelihood estimation. Likelihood is a general description of probability or frequency. For the
purposes of this project, ‘likelihood’ has been described according to the likelihood table (Table 1).
Table 1.

Nomenclature for the qualitative likelihood estimations used in this RA (modified from
Diggles 2011).

Likelihood (score)

Definition

High (6)

The event would be very likely to occur (>55%)

Moderate (5)

The event would occur with an even probability

Low (4)

The event would be unlikely to occur (20-45%)

Very Low (3)

The event would be very unlikely to occur (1-19%)

Extremely low (2)

The event would be extremely unlikely to occur (0.9-0.1%)

Negligible (1)

The event would almost certainly not occur (<0. 1%)

Consequences assessment. These are the outcomes, or impact of a given event. In a disease
based risk assessment it is usual to have a range of four or five consequences ranging from
negligible to severe (Jones & Stephens 2006, Diggles 2011). The general consequence table and
levels used in this assessment are shown in Table 2.
The overall level of risk is usually calculated as the mathematical product of the likelihood and
consequence levels (Risk = Likelihood x Consequence) and is called the ‘risk value’. These
values are usually displayed as a ‘risk matrix table’ (Table 3). From the ‘risk value’ each issue
can be assigned a ‘risk ranking’ depending upon where a risk value falls within one of a number
of predetermined categories or criteria (Table 4).
Though the method is based on an arithmetic scale for ease of calculation, the nature of
‘consequences’, in particular, is not linear. The risk values in Table 3 have been separated into
three risk ranking categories. Risk ranking categories may be more or less than three, but three
is a commonly used number (HB 436: 2004).
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Table 2.

The General Consequence Levels for Assessment of Disease Impacts

Level

Descriptor

Low (1)

Establishment of the disease has mild biological consequence and would be
amenable to control or eradication and/or;
May harm economic performance at an enterprise level but be of limited
significance at an industry level and/or;
Effect on environment would be minor or temporary.

Moderate (2)

Establishment of the disease has moderate biological consequences and
disease may be amenable to control or eradication, at a significant cost and/or;
May harm economic performance at an industry level and/or;
May affect the environment, but not seriously and may be reversible.

High (3)

Establishment of the disease would have serious biological consequences
(high mortality or morbidity etc) with effects that would be felt for a prolonged
period and would difficult to control or eradicate and/or;
Will significantly harm economic performance at an industry level or regional
level and may cause serious harm to the environment.

Catastrophic (4)

Establishment of the disease would significantly harm economic performance
at a national level and/or;
May cause long-term or irreversible harm to the environment.

Table 3.

Risk Matrix – numbers in cells indicate Risk Value, the colours/shades indicate Risk
Rankings (see Table 4 for details)

Likelihood

Low

Moderate

High

Catastrophic

1

2

3

4

Negligible

1

1

2

3

4

Extremely Low

2

2

4

6

8

Very Low

3

3

6

9

12

Low

4

4

8

12

16

Moderate

5

5

10

15

20

High

6

6

12

18

24

Table 4.

Risk Rankings and Outcomes

Risk Rankings

Risk Values

Likely Management Response

Negligible,
Acceptable

1–5

Risks are acceptable and are managed through current
procedures.

Moderate,
Management

6 – 10

Risks are acceptable provided Risk Reduction measures are
implemented to reduce risk to acceptable level.

Extreme,
Unacceptable

11 – 24

Risk is unacceptable. Risk management measures will be
required to achieve “acceptable risk”, or it may not be possible
to meet the “acceptable risk” at all.
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Acceptable risk. The acceptability of risk in a particular circumstance is perceived differently by
different individuals and organizations including governments. Governments accept taking risks
because of the net community benefits (which may be environmental, social or financial) that are
expected to accrue from their risk-taking behaviour. The amount of risk they will tolerate (i.e.
the ‘expected loss’ if things go wrong) is known by a variety of terms including ‘acceptable level
of risk’ (SPS Agreement), ‘tolerable risk’ (HB 436: 2004) or the ‘appropriate level of protection
(ALOP)’ (Biosecurity Australia).

3.4

Risk management

This involves the process of identifying, evaluating and monitoring measures that can be taken
to ensure that the risk is reduced to a level consistent with the acceptable level of risk. This can
be done either by reducing the probability of the event occurring (preventative measures), or
by reducing the consequences should the event occur (mitigation measures). The measures that
are implemented must be the minimum required to achieve the acceptable level of risk and are
not to be used as a disguised restriction on trade. They must also be “transparent” i.e. readily
available to interested parties and the scientific justification provided as required.
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4.0

What We Know About AVG?

Abalone Viral Ganglioneuritis is caused by highly virulent herpes-like-virus (AbHV-1) that
affects the nervous tissue of abalone causing rapid mortality (Hooper et al. 2007, Savin et al.
2010). The species known to be susceptible to AbHV-1 in Australia are the greenlip abalone
(Haliotis laevigata), blacklip abalone (H. rubra) and hybrids of these two species (Hooper et
al. 2007). Clinical signs consistent with AVG have not been reported in other molluscan species
in areas where AbHV-1 is suspected to be enzootic.
The AbHV-1 virus spreads through direct contact, through the water column without contact and
it can also be spread to healthy abalone by offal, mucus, shells, contaminated fishing equipment
or people who have been handling abalone (Crane et al. 2009). The mucus from infected abalone
is thought to be the main pathway through which the disease can spread.
The AbHV-1 virus first appeared in abalone farms in southern Victoria in late 2005, and
subsequently spread to the wild abalone fishery along 280 km of coastline at a rate of 5 to 10
km/month (Hills 2007), causing a reduction of total allowable catch (TAC) in the fishery from
280 tonnes to 16 tonnes (Mayfield et al. 2011). Outbreaks of AVG in both farmed and wild
abalone populations in Victoria were associated with high mortality rates (up to 90%) in all age
classes (Hooper et al. 2009). Subsequent outbreaks of AVG occurred in Tasmanian processing
facilities in 2008, in 2009 and again during December 2010 and January 2011. On the latter
occasion an abalone farm neighbouring one of the processors at Bicheno was also infected, with
high mortalities (DPIPWE situation report Feb 2011). The wild fishery abalone at Bicheno also
tested positive for the virus after the outbreak, but without mortalities (ABC News 21/1/2011).
Sampling of sites identified by trace-back from the affected processor in 2008 resulted in one
wild abalone from the southern D’Entrecasteaux Channel returning a weak PCR positive for
AbHV-1. (DPIW situation report dated 21 Oct 2008). Surveys have shown that AbHV-1 occurs
naturally at very low prevalences (3 out of 1625 abalone = 0.18% prevalence) in subclinical
infections of wild populations of abalone in Tasmania (Corbeil et al. 2010). The virus also
occurs in the coastal waters of western Victoria at moderate prevalences (Crane et al. 2009,
Corbeil et al. 2010).
Diagnostic testing: The ORF-49 TaqMan PCR test for AbHV-1 developed by Australian
Animal Health Laboratory was validated using abalone from both the Victorian and the initial
Tasmanian disease outbreaks (Corbeil et al. 2010). However, during 2009 it was found that
clinically affected abalone did not provide positive results using the ORF-49 TaqMan PCR test
and alternative TaqMan tests (ORF-66 and ORF-77) were required to confirm the presence of
AbHV-1. This development led to the conclusion that there were probably a number of strains
of the virus present in Tasmania, and not all would react consistently with a given TaqMan PCR
test. At the present time the Victorian strain and each of the three known Tasmanian strains are
considered distinct variations of the same virus. (Corbeil 2011, Mark Crane pers. com.).

Fisheries Research Report [Western Australia] No. 227, 2012

7

5.0

The Assessment

5.1

Hazard identification

The diagram of pathways identified through which a “failure” – AbHV-1 in the environment
resulting in risk of an AVG outbreak either by the abalone farming operations or by the
enhancement proposal, are shown in Figure 1. Using the pathways identified in this figure a
table of Consequence and Likelihoods has been constructed (See Table 5).
The assessments of risk presented in Table 1 separates those associated with the current
aquaculture operations from those potentially additional risks associated with the proposed
stock enhancement of juvenile abalone sourced from the aquaculture facility.
Summarising from Table 1 the following issues require consideration of risk reduction measures:

5.2

Issues for which Consideration of Additional Treatments
is Required

yy ISSUE 5 ABHV-1 in broodstock generated from importing interstate broodstock.
(Risk Score of 6)
yy ISSUE 6 ABHV-1 carried into hatchery on incoming equipment and people from interstate
(Risk Score of 9)
yy ISSUE 8 ABHV-1 in farm effluent (Risk score 9)

5.3

Issues Requiring Additional Treatments to Be Acceptable

The following issues with the currently levels of controls in place represented unacceptable risk,
requiring risk management:
yy Issue 3 AbHV-1 is already present but undetected in WA wild abalone and a mutation or
environmental event (possibly due to culturing system increases it’s virulence) affects
broodstock. (Risk score 12 in absence of any additional mitigation controls outlined below)
yy Issue 9 ABHV-1 is in F1 generation abalone in hatchery or farm but undetected due to no
testing being done or the test does not work on the strain. These infected individuals are
put out into the ocean infecting the local wild stock with a virulent strain (Risk score 12 in
absence of any additional mitigation controls outlined below)

8
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6.0

Possible Management Measures to Mitigate the Risk

The detailed set of potential risk mitigation measures that could be implemented to reduce the
risks associated with the abalone aquaculture facility and abalone re-seeding or sea ranching
are presented in Table 6.
Summarising from Table 6 the following mitigation measures have been identified which cover
operations of the hatchery, deployment of juveniles into the ocean and recommendations for
management.

6.1

Hatchery

The Hatchery should review its current Biosecurity Plan to ensure that it is comprehensive and
that staff are suitably trained. Attention must be given to:
oo Routine decontamination of personnel at all entry points
oo Routine decontamination of all incoming equipment
oo Independent audit of the Biosecurity Plan

oo Routine testing of broodstock and other selected animals from the hatchery and adjacent
farm (underway)
oo Maintenance of broodstock in tanks spatially separated from all other abalone, all
equipment used with broodstock not to be used elsewhere, and effluent water from
broodstock tanks must not be reused or discharged to the sea.
yy Use of effluent pond to dilute outflow.
yy Positioning of outlet pipes away from wild abalone fishery areas
yy Use of abalone feed that is free of abalone products

6.2

Marine Growout and Enhancement Protocols

The areas used to place the artificial structures for the marine grow-out of hatchery reared abalone
would best be located on sandy substrates without direct contact to reefs, preferably away from
reefs where significant level of harvesting of wild capture stocks of abalone is undertaken.
yy The trials of enhancement should be completed on reefs which are spatially separated from
the remainder of the fishery.
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6.3

Management

In considering ongoing management, the following is recommended:
yy Adopt as formal policy the 5 nm separation of aquaculture/processing facilities
yy Ensure regular compliance visits, inspecting farm records
yy Ensure vigilant compliance to prevent uncontrolled interstate and intrastate movements of
wild abalone
yy Adopt as formal policy the compulsory shut down of water supply on detection
yy Adopt as formal policy the compulsory cessation of reseeding activity and traceback if AbHV1 detected in abalone (either broodstock or F1 juveniles) from the hatchery or elsewhere in
WA. (application of Fisheries Resource Management Regulation 177(2))
yy Use the 99% confidence level when setting sample sizes for translocation. This was agreed
by the Department in 19991 .
yy Maintain the present close linkages with the OIE reference laboratory on AVG (AAHL
Geelong)
yy Continue to use histology as well as qPCR for routine health testing

1 The level of disease testing for imported abalone has been set at 99% confidence (Application to translocate aquatic organism.
Statement of decision dated 22 June 1999). However, the disease testing and certification procedures used are based on probability
theory - typically the probability of detecting a disease in 99% of the animals tested. Examining 300 animals gives a 99% assurance
that a disease of at least 2% prevalence in the test population would be detected, assuming the method was completely accurate and
no mistakes were made.

10

Fisheries Research Report [Western Australia] No. 227, 2012

7.0

Independent Review

This risk assessment has been reviewed by Dr Ben Diggles of DigsFish Services Pty Ltd.
http://www.digsfish.com/2 .
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Table 5.

Risk Table for assessing the risk of developing AbHV in wild stock abalone associated with
the current aquaculture production of abalone and the potential re-seeding of abalone

Issue/Hazard

Comments

Likelihood
and
Consequence
Scores for
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Current Risk
Ranking
from
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Additional
Risk
associated
with
Reseeding
Trials and Sea
ranching

Consequence
LOW

RISK No increase
NEGLIGIBLE

DISEASE PROBLEMS BEGIN IN WILD STOCK
1. AbHV-1 Is
already present
but undetected in
WA wild abalone
and it is found
by increased or
improved testing.

The presence of AbHV-1
in Victorian and Tasmanian
waters was not known until
outbreaks occurred in live
holding processing facilities.
For Tasmania the virus was
endemic, but the situation
and origin of the disease in
Victoria is less clear

Farm blamed but
not affected.

There is a Low likelihood that
AbHV-1 may already exist
in the wild in WA and is not
currently causing significant
disease issues.

Likelihood
LOW

Abalone farms have been
operating in Bremer Bay for
a number of years without
AbHV-1 being detected, and
testing of abalone in WA
using PCR specific for the
known strains of AbHV-1 and
histology, which picks up the
nerve changes caused by all
known strains of this virus,
have all been negative.
If a strain of AbHV-1 is already
here that is not causing
problems, the impact on the
wild fishery may not change.
Thus the consequences are
assessed as low

12
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Issue/Hazard

Comments

Likelihood
and
Consequence
Scores for
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Current Risk
Ranking
from
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Additional
Risk
associated
with
Reseeding
Trials and Sea
ranching

2. AbHV-1 Is
already present
but undetected in
WA wild abalone
and a mutation
or environmental
event occurs that
increases it’s
virulence.

Given that there is no defined
cause for the initial outbreak
in Victoria or Tasmania, it is
possible that this was due to
a change in the nature of an
endemic disease that became
more virulent.

Consequence
moderate

RISK No increase
NEGLIGIBLE

Farm blamed but
not affected.

In Victoria the virus caused
mass mortality in the wild.
However, In Tasmania it
has always been a disease
in processing live holding
facilities until this last
December when it spread
from a processor to the wild,
then into an adjacent farm
(150metres away) where it
did cause mortalities. Though
detected in the wild, it did not
cause any wild mortalities,
just the farm.

Likelihood
Extremely
LOW

Given the absence of any
evidence of current endemic
infections, here in WA, the
potential consequence if this
arose naturally in the wild
could be MODERATE
The likelihood of this level
of consequence actually
happening based on this
scenario is extremely low.
DISEASE PROBLEMS BEGIN IN farms
3. AbHV-1 Is
already present
but undetected in
WA wild abalone
and a mutation
or environmental
event due to
culturing system
increases
it’s virulence
and affects
broodstock.

It is possible that the
change in virulence could be
facilitated or exacerbated by
culturing methods.

Consequence
HIGH
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Consequence HIGH
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Issue/Hazard

4. AbHV-1 enters
by farm inlet
water or other
invertebrate
vectors near inlet.

Comments

Likelihood
and
Consequence
Scores for
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Current Risk
Ranking
from
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Additional
Risk
associated
with
Reseeding
Trials and Sea
ranching

Two farms have operated on
Likelihood
the site (now amalgamated)
LOW
since 1999 without any
evidence of high mortalities or
of AbHV-1.

Likelihood:
No additional
controls –
LOW

Since 1999 over 1000
abalone have been examined,
by histology, for disease.

With additional
controls –
VERY LOW

If this did happen the potential
consequence would be HIGH.

RISK:
High (no
additional
controls)

Given that this has not
occurred in the past 10 years,
the likelihood is Low to Very
Low.

Moderate (with
additional
controls)

For this to occur, the AVG
virus must already be in wild
abalone in vicinity of the
hatchery and if it is virulent
it would have already been
accounted for above.

Consequence:
Moderate
(Wildstock
only)

Unlike the Tasmanian
experience, there are no live
holding processors or other
farms or hatcheries in the
vicinity from which the virus
could arise independently.

Likelihood:
EXTREMELY
LOW

RISK
Negligible

No Increase

The likelihood of ABHV-1 that
are endemic to WA being in
the water supply appears to
be Extremely Low, based on
no detection since 1999 but
the potential consequences
of ABHV-1 in the inlet water
could be a problem for the
farm because once in the
inlet water, deaths in the
farm would occur (based
on the Tasmanian and
Victorian experience). But the
consequence would not be
that high for the wild stock
if there is no evidence of
mortalities beforehand.
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Issue/Hazard

Comments

Likelihood
and
Consequence
Scores for
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Current Risk
Ranking
from
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Additional
Risk
associated
with
Reseeding
Trials and Sea
ranching

5. ABHV-1 in
broodstock
generated
from importing
interstate
broodstock.

Only abalone broodstock
from the area where release
will occur are allowed. The
potential consequences
of finding ABHV-1 in the
broodstock are High.

Consequence
– HIGH

Risk Moderate

No Increase

Risk Moderate

No Increase

Likelihood EXTREMELY
LOW

Interstate importation of live
abalone is prohibited and
there are only disincentives
for local industry to use
imported broodstock.
Given the current protocols
the Likelihood of this outcome
occurring is Extremely Low
6. ABHV-1 carried
into hatchery
on incoming
equipment and
people from
interstate.

The hatchery and the farm
would face major losses and
threaten health of wild stock
if ABHV-1 occurs, hence the
consequences are High

Consequence
– HIGH

The hatchery has already
identified this as a biosecurity
issue in their Biosecurity Plan
and has measures in place
to prevent it occurring. In
addition, the long distances
between Victoria and WA
ensure that equipment is
unlikely to arrive in a dirty wet
condition
NOTE - The likelihood of this
outcome occurring is initially
rated as Very Low but with the
industry protocols in place the
likelihood would be reduced to
Extremely Low.

Likelihood
– VERY
LOW (based
on legal
requirements –
not on current
practices
which would
reduce this to
extremely low)

7. ABHV-1
contaminated
feed

There is a negligible
possibility that the disease
could be introduced via
contaminated feed. Abalone
products are not used in the
processed feed used in the
hatchery. In the wild, the
abalone will eat natural plant
material.

Consequence
– High

Risk No Increase
NEGLIGIBLE

LikelihoodNegligible
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Issue/Hazard

Comments

Likelihood
and
Consequence
Scores for
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Current Risk
Ranking
from
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Additional
Risk
associated
with
Reseeding
Trials and Sea
ranching

8. ABHV-1 in
farm effluent

For this to occur there
would need to already be an
infection in the farm
(see above).

Consequence
– HIGH

Moderate

No Increase

N/A

Consequence
– HIGH

Likelihood The Hatchery does not
discharge into the sea. The
VERY LOW
consequences depend on
the flow rates, flow duration
and farm being near suitable
abalone habitat but have been
assessed as “high”.
9. ABHV-1 is in
F1 generation
abalone in
hatchery or farm
but undetected
due to no
testing being
done or the test
does not work
on the strain.
These infected
individuals are
put out into the
ocean infecting
the local wild
stock with a
virulent strain

16

N/A
For this to occur, the F1
generation from the hatchery
would have had to have
contracted the ABHV-1 from
the inlet water (Likelihood is
Extremely Low), contaminated
equipment (Likelihood is
Extremely Low with controls)
or be generated from infected
locally sourced broodstock
(Likelihood Low) which have
gone undetected (Likelihood
is Extremely Low with
additional controls).

Likelihood:
No additional
controls - LOW
With additional
controls –
VERY LOW

The rationale for the
likelihoods associated with
each of these events are
discussed elsewhere in this
table.

RISK:
High (no
additional
controls)

To affect the wildstock these
infected individuals must also
have not been tested prior
to seeding or the test used
was not effective for detecting
the strain. The Likelihood of
this occurring is Low given
that the current PCR tests
have not always picked up
all strains, but the testing of
nerve ends should identify
affected individuals.

Moderate (with
additional
controls)
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Issue/Hazard

Comments

Likelihood
and
Consequence
Scores for
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Current Risk
Ranking
from
Aquaculture
Facility
Operations

Additional
Risk
associated
with
Reseeding
Trials and Sea
ranching

Plus there must have been
no evidence of problems
in the rest in the rest of the
farm broodstock, or other
growout individuals, or these
problems were ignored. Given
the rapid impacts in the farms
in Tasmania and Victoria the
Likelihood of this is VERY
LOW.
Consequently, the overall
Likelihood of having infected
animals being reseeded and
impacting the wildstock if
no additional controls are in
place is LOW.
If additional controls for
testing and isolating animals
to be reseeded are instigated,
the Likelihood would be
reduced to VERY LOW of
the farm broodstock, or other
growout individuals, or these
problems were ignored. Given
the rapid impacts in the farms
in Tasmania and Victoria the
Likelihood of this is VERY
LOW.
Consequently, the overall
Likelihood of having infected
animals being reseeded and
impacting the wildstock if
no additional controls are in
place is LOW.
If additional controls for
testing and isolating animals
to be reseeded are instigated,
the Likelihood would be
reduced to VERY LOW.
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Table 6.

Possible Mitigation Measures

Issue

Issue #3. ABHV1 detected in
broodstock

Risk score Nature of
unacceptable
risk
12

Threat of
AVG infection
of abalone
populations in
hatchery, including
abalone used for
reseeding

Possible Risk
Management Measures

Risk Score
with additional
Mitigation

Screening of all broodstock,
biosecurity protocols that
require holding broodstock
completely separate to other
abalone in the hatchery or
on farm, including no reuse
of broodstock effluent water

Consequence –
HIGH

Comprehensive Biosecurity
Plan and trained staff

Risk Score now
= 8 (Moderate),

Controls reduce
Likelihood from
Low to Very
Low

Compulsory cessation
of reseeding activity
and traceback if AbHV-1
detected in any abalone
from the hatchery or the
farm
Issue #9. ABHV1 detected in
F1 generation
of abalone in
hatchery or farm

Issue #9 (part)
ABHV-1 infects
the F1 which is
not detected or
before these are
deployed

12

12

Threat that
infected abalone
in hatchery and
those used for
reseeding could
infect wild abalone

Routine testing of selected
animals from the hatchery
and the farm
Compulsory cessation
of reseeding activity
and traceback if AbHV-1
detected in abalone from the
hatchery

Ensure that the abalone
juveniles released for
grow out are spatially
separated from significant
local densities of wild stock
by situating the grow-out
structures on sand away
from reefs.

Consequence –
HIGH
Additional
controls reduce
the Likelihood
from Low to
Very Low
Risk Score = 8
(Moderate)
Consequence
Moderate – Low
Likelihood Very Low
Risk Score = 6
(Moderate)

For enhancement purposes,
use sections of reefs that
are spatially separated from
the rest of the population
These would both further
reduce likelihood of infection
passing to wild stock
This separation should also
reduce the consequence
level to Moderate or Low if
infection did occur because
it would restrict its spread to
other locations.
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Issue

Risk score Nature of unacceptable
risk

Possible Risk Management
Measures

Issue # 4
ABHV-1 in farm/
hatchery inlet
water or other
invertebrate
vectors

4

Threat to abalone
populations on farm

Testing of abalone and other gastropod
populations adjacent to farm inlet

Issue #5. ABHV1 in broodstock
abalone from
interstate.

6

Threat that infected
abalone could be bought
into the facility and used
as broodstock, resulting
in threat to abalone
populations in hatchery

Screening of broodstock, testing of
abalone before they leave broodstock
area,
Biosecurity protocols that require
holding broodstock completely
separate to other abalone, including
disposal of broodstock effluent water
Comprehensive Biosecurity Plan and
trained staff
Regular compliance visits and audit of
records

Issue #6.
ABHV-1 carried
into hatchery
on incoming
equipment and
personnel.

Issue #8
(part). ABHV-1
detected in farm/
hatchery by staff
but not reported
to Department

9

6

This is a risk that is
recognised in the Farm
Biosecurity Plan and
management controls are
in place to ensure that it
doesn’t happen. However,
the consequences of
an outbreak of AVG in
the farm are severe
both in terms of control
measures (destocking
and decontamination) and
in public relations.

Routine decontamination of incoming
equipment

Reporting unexplained
mortalities is a
requirement under the
regulations. However,
this scenario actually
happened in a processing
plant in Tasmania so
the likelihood has been
assessed as extremely
low but not negligible.
The consequences, for
everyone involved, are
very high

Regular compliance visits, inspecting
farm records

Independent audit of the Biosecurity
Plan
Regular compliance visits
Routine testing of selected animals
from the farm

Independent audit?
Comprehensive Biosecurity Plan and
trained staff
Routine testing of selected animals
from the farm
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Issue
Issue #8 (part).
ABHV-1 in farm
effluent

Risk score Nature of unacceptable
risk
9

The presence of ABHV-1
in farm effluent (however
caused) would have
serious socio-economic
consequences.
The impact on the
wild fishery is difficult
to predict (Victorian
experience differs from
Tasmanian experience)

Possible Risk Management
Measures
Use of effluent pond to dilute outflow.
Positioning of outlet pipes away from
wild fishery areas
Adoption of 5 nm separation of farms/
processing facilities
Routine testing of farm animals
(underway)
Comprehensive Biosecurity Plan and
trained staff
Compulsory shut down of water supply
on detection (as in Tasmania, but
not practiced in the original Victorian
outbreak)

Issue #9 (part).
Abalone not
submitted for
testing

6

Failure to detect ABHV-1
when it may be present

Regular compliance visits, inspecting
farm records
Independent sampling and audit
Comprehensive Biosecurity Plan and
trained staff
Routine testing of selected animals
from the farm

Issue #9 (part).
ABHV-1 not
detected by
testing

20

9

The PCR test is very
sensitive, but the
continued finding of
strains in Tasmania is
problematic. A paper on
sample sizes used in
testing was written for the
pearling industry in 1998
(attached).

Use the 99% confidence level when
setting sample sizes for translocation.
This was agreed by the Department in
1999.

The ABHV-1 gene has
been sequenced by
AAHL and SARDI, and
the sequence will be
used by them to develop
new tests based on
conservative genes.

Use histology as well as qPCR for
routine health testing

Maintain close linkages with the OIE
reference laboratory on AVG (AAHL
Geelong) to ensure latest tests are
used.
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